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The empirical evidence of low effectiveness for growth of investment in physical and 
human capital policies based on international aid is analyzed and discussed (§ 1 and 2). 
Reasons are linked both to limits of analytical and econometric methods (§ 4) and the 
existence of strong complementarities between different dimensions of macroeconomic, 
social and institutional context (§ 3). We critically discuss the new strategies proposed to 
gain effectiveness in development projects and policies. 
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The evidence of different long-period growth paths in different regions of the 
world  (Maddison  2001)  has  generated  much  debate.  The  focus  has  been  on 
verification of the determinants of growth and the effectiveness of the aid granted 
to the less developed countries, whilst the problem of the relationship between 
economic growth and development has been pushed into the background. It has 
long been commonplace to regard economic growth as the most obvious form in 
which  the  development  of  a  society  is  manifest:  strong  economic  growth  is 
symptomatic  of  ongoing  cultural  and  behavioural  changes  which  enable  that 
growth to become permanent. Nevertheless, it has often been argued, reversing 
the  causal  connection,  that  if  quantitative  growth  processes  are  to  begin,  it  is 
necessary to involve the underlying dimensions of development and set them in 
motion.  For  many  years,  therefore,  the  attention  has  concentrated  on  various 
‘recipes’ with which to start up growth. 
In the early post-war years (see e.g. Nurkse 1953), the lack of growth was 
blamed on scant investments due to low saving capacity (gap financing theory). 
The action of the International Financial Institutions (IFI) was for long influenced   2 
by the idea that the problem of economic growth could be solved by off-setting a 
lack of resources for investments with international aid. King and Levine (1994) 
stressed that “few economic ideas are as intuitive as the notion that increasing 
investment is the best way to raise future outputs, either for an individual or a 
nation” (p. 1). Over time, however the gap financing approach proved inadequate 
both  theoretically  and  empirically.  From  the  theoretical  point  of  view,  the 
importance  became  apparent  of  other  factors,  such  as  human  capital  and 
technological knowledge, and attention increasingly shifted to the quality of the 
macroeconomic  and  socio-institutional  context  of  countries  as  a  necessary 
condition for the start-up of substantial growth processes, and therefore for the 
effectiveness of aid itself. From the empirical point of view, the results of a large 
body of literature which had analysed the relationship between aid, investments 
and growth, were controversial and yielded ambiguous information. In a recent 
paper,  Rajan  and  Subramanian  (2005)  have  summarized  the  debate  on  the 
effectiveness  of  growth  aid  thus:  “one  of  the  most  important  and  intriguing 
puzzles in economics [is] why is it so hard to find a robust effect of aid on the 
long-term growth of poor countries, even those with good policies?” (p. 1). 
In this paper we analyse the effectiveness of aid and policies for growth based 
on investment in the basic production factors (physical and human capital). These 
are policies more frequently implemented in the second half of the last century 
and  connected  with  generally  adopted  theoretical  models.  It  was  believed  that 
industrialization and investment in capital were decisive steps towards sustained 
growth. The national import substitution strategies adopted during the 1950s in 
Latin America required high investments financed by agricultural surpluses. Also 
models of export-led growth presupposed a good endowment of physical capital 
and human capital, because the accumulation of knowledge is at the basis of the 
export sector’s competitiveness (Grossman and Helpman, 1989 and 1990; Romer, 
1990). 
In 1971, John Holsen, an economist at the World Bank, developed a model 
which  estimated  a  country’s  investment  requirements,  and  he  furnished 
information on the necessary level of aid by using the sectoral interdependences 
approach of Chenery and Strout (1966). This was an instrument intended to be 
temporary  while  waiting  the  development  of  specific  models.  However,  it 
continued to be used to forecast investment needs after it was realized that the 
model did not yield correct estimates and that the mere accumulation of physical 
capital  was  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  development  (Meier,  1995;  Todaro, 
2000). The success of this model exemplifies the belief that aid is a sufficient 
condition  to  generate  growth.  However  empirical  studies  are  far  from  giving 
robust  evidence  to  support  this  belief.  The  general  question  that  arises  from 
examination of the results in the literature is whether it is advisable to reverse the 
causal nexus by considering economic growth as the result of a broader process of 
development.   3 
It should be pointed out that the relation between the endowment of production 
factors  and  economic  performance  depends  on  other  characteristics,  like  trade 
openness. For this reason, the empirical studies analysed below often consider 
variables that estimate the degree of openness of economies. In this paper we shall 
not be concerned with the specific impact of policies for commercial and financial 
liberalization on the growth capacities of countries (as regards the former, see the 
surveys by Berg and Krueger (2003), Winters (2004) and Wacziarg and Welch 
(2008); as regards the latter, see Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008)). 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section analyses gap financing 
policies aimed in particular at the formation of physical capital (infrastructures, 
instrumental capital, technology) and the main empirical results on the relation 
among aid, investments and growth. Section 2 examines policies targeted on the 
formation  of  human  capital.  Section  3  analyses  the  main  factors  reducing  the 
positive impact of aid and investments in physical and human capital on growth, 
with particular regard to the issue of conditionality. Finally, section 4 emphasises 
some  methodological  problems  concerning  empirical  analysis  of  the  relation 
between aid and growth. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1 The link between aid, physical capital investment and growth 
 
There is a huge body of literature on the effectiveness of aid for investment in 
physical capital, and various classifications have been proposed (Hansen and Tarp 
2000, Roodman 2007). Here we use a classification devised by Doucouliagos and 
Paldam  (2005,  2006,  2008),  who  distinguish  among  three  groups  of  empirical 
analyses: 
·  studies on the relationship between aid and savings and between aid and 
investments; 
·  studies on the relationship between aid and growth; 
·  studies on the relationship between aid and growth which consider a set of 
variables conditioning that relationship. 
 
1.1. The relationship between aid and investments 
Analysis  of  the  empirical  linkage  among  aid,  savings  and  investments 
dominated the first phase of study on aid effectiveness (Griffin and Enos, 1970, 
Papanek,  1972).  The  econometric  approach  was  based  on  a  model  in  which 
investment depends on saving, the flows of aid, and private or institutional flows 
of capital from abroad. The theoretical references were Rostow’s model of the 
stages of growth, according to which “take-off into sustained growth” implies a 
raise  in  the  share  of  saving  and  investment  in  GDP  (Rostow  1960)  and  a 
‘neoclassical’  interpretation  of  the  Harrod-Domar  model  according  to  which 
saving is the basis of investment. The equation connecting investments, savings 
and aid can be written as follows:   4 
[1]    it = st + at + fpt + fot 
where the variables respectively represent investments, savings, aid, flows of 
private capital and other financial flows as proportions of GDP. Since aid and 
savings  are  correlated,  aid  increases  investments  only  if  it  does  not  entirely 
‘crowd out’ national savings. There fore, earlier studies have been concerned with 
the effect of aid on savings. 
Harms  and  Lutz  (2004)  report  the  results  of  several  surveys  on  studies 
examining  the  aid/savings  relation  (Table  1)  and  the  aid/investments  relation 
(Table 2) conducted in the period 1996-2001. It appears that, in more than half of 
cases, aid entirely or more than entirely crowded out savings (counter-productive 
effect), although a number of studies showed only partial crowding-out, and in 
some cases a positive effect of aid on savings. Estimates of the effect of aid on 
investments furnish an even more varied picture. Hansen and Tarp (2000) find 
that the effectiveness of aid for investment is the norm; other studies like those of 
Easterly  (1999)  and  Harms  and  Lutz  (2004)  are  more  uncertain  and  report  a 
substantial number of cases in which the estimated coefficient is not significant or 
even negative.  
In  a  study  resuming  his  work  of  1999,  Easterly  (2001)  found  that  the 
regression coefficient of the share of investments in GDP on the share of ODA
1 in 
GDP was positive, significant and greater than 1 in only six countries out of 88. 
Eleven other countries exhibited a positive and significant correlation between aid 
and investments with a coefficient less than 1. In 36 cases, the coefficient was 
negative and significant. In the remaining cases the regression coefficient was not 
significant. 
Also the meta-analyses by Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006, 2008 and 2009) 
report inconclusive results. The authors consider a series of studies on the relation 
between  aid  and  saving  (90  observations)  and  aid  and  investment  (122 
observations).  As  regards  the  former  relation,  they  show  that  aid  crowds  out 
savings  to  a  considerable  but  not  total  extent  (the  average  crowding-out 
coefficient is 53%), although there are cases in which the crowding-out is equal to 
100% or greater. The results are less satisfactory if the aid/investments relation is 
analysed.  On  average,  aid  translates  into  investments  in  a  proportion  equal  to 
25%; for the remaining part aid leads to a substantial increase in current public 
spending (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009; see also Boone, 1996).  
                                                 
1 Official Development Assistance (ODA) is aid by DAC member-countries, or by multilateral 
institutions to developing countries. Such funds comprise a grant of at least 25%.   5
Table 1 – Results of regressions between aid (share of GDP) and saving (share of GDP) 














coeff.  positive 
significant coeff. 
Hansen & Tarp (2000)
1  24 (22)  1  13  8  14  10  0 
Boone (1996)
2  8  0  7  1  8  0  0 
Harms & Lutz (2004)
3  94  11  38  45  41  40  13 
               
Notes: 
1 taken from 6 studies had published between 1973 and 1992; 
2 panels of estimated data, 96 countries, 5-year average 1971-90; 
3 94 countries, annual data, 1960-2001, aid lagged by one period. 
Source: Harms and Lutz (2004) 
 
Table 2 – Results of regressions between aid (share of GDP) and saving (share of GDP) 
         
  Number of observations  significant negative coeff.  non-significant coeff.  positive significant coeff. 
Hansen & Tarp (2000)
1  16  0  1  15 
Boone (1996)
2  8  0  7  1 
Easterly (1999)
 3  88  36  35  17 
Harms & Lutz (2004)
4  94  22  41  31 
         
Notes: 
1 (drawn from 7 studies published between 1972 and 1998); 
2 (panel data, 10- year average, 96 countries, 1971-90); 
3 (annual data, 1965-95); 
4 (annual data, 1960-2001, aid lagged by one period). 
Source: Harms and Lutz (2004).   6 
This concerns the fungibility of aid: the resources furnished through aid go to 
projects which would have anyway been undertaken by the receiving countries, 
and  the  resources  thus  freed  up  translate  into  greater  public  consumption; 
therefore, the effective marginal activity made possible by aid is in many cases 
not activity aimed at accumulation. Moreover, according to Barder (2006), large 
flows of aid discourage private investment because they may produce inflation, 
cause the domestic currency to appreciate, and create forms of Dutch disease. 
 
1.2. The relationship between investments and growth 
 
We have seen that in some cases aid does not crowds out savings and actually 
increases investment, at least in a small proportion, but does this enhance growth? 
Empirical studies of the relationship between savings, investments and growth 
present once  again  controversial  results. The relationship between savings  and 
investments is sufficiently strong (for the developed countries), and also appears 
positive  and  significant  in  highly  open  economies,  where  one  would  expect  a 
country’s savings to be translated into investments in other countries (see on this 
Feldstein and Horioka, 1980, and Holmes 2005, for the positive hypothesis of co-
integration between savings and investments; Vamvakidis and Wacziarg 1998 for 
the opposite hypothesis; some studies conclude that the relationship is strong in 
developed  countries,  doubtful  in  backward  countries).  More  debatable  is  the 
relationship  between  investments  and  growth.  A  well-known  article  by 
Blömstrom et al. (1996) tested the relationship between the growth rate (five-year 
averages) and an indicator of accumulation in the periods prior to, current with, 
and following the period to which the growth referred (the data concerned 101 
countries for the period 1965-1985). The authors found that, when controlling for 
the heterogeneity of countries with country dummies, the relationship between 
investment in the previous period and growth was negative and significant, that 
between  accumulation  and  current  growth  was  nil,  while  the  coefficient  was 
positive and significant between accumulation in period t+1 and growth in period 
t. The Granger causality test showed a positive relationship between growth and 
subsequent  accumulation  (probably  due  to  increased  saving),  while  the  other 
direction of causality did not pass the test. Blömstrom et al. concluded that “there 
is no evidence that fixed investment is the key to growth”. The true factors for 
growth, according to the authors, lie elsewhere: in the quality of human capital, 
technological externalities, and institutional characteristics. This is synthesized in 
the  pithy  title  of  Easterly  and  Levine’s  (2001)  article:  “It’s  not  Factor 
Accumulation, It’s TFP” that is the fundamental determinant of growth. Other 
studies  have  obtained  similar  results.  Attanasio  et  al.  (2000)  analysed  the 
relationship among savings, investments and growth using World Bank data for 
123  countries  (period  1961-1994),  and  their  results  were  similar  to  those  of 
Blömstrom et al. (see also Podrecca and Carmeci 2001).   7 
Opposite conclusions have been reached by Bond et al.’s (2004) study on 90 
countries for the period 1960-1998. According to these authors, the theoretical 
hypothesis of a close relationship between accumulation and growth is confirmed: 
“an increase in the share of investments predicts a higher growth of output per 
worker both in the short run and in the steady state” (p. 32; see also Li 2002). 
Romero-Avila (2008)  obtained similar results and underlined that the  negative 
results of previous studies contrast with a large body of literature (see, as early as  
the 1960s, Hill, 1964). He suggested that the use of data on longer periods tends to 
confirm  the  hypothesis.  Nevertheless,  the  analyses  of  Chandra  and  Sandilands 
(2003 and 2005) on India showed that in the long run it is growth that drives 
investments. To complicate matters further, a recent study by Crowder and de 
Jong (2009) shows that, in the African and developing countries, the significant 
causal relation is from growth to accumulation, not vice versa. 
The  hypothesis  that  the  simplest  way  to  foster  growth  is  to  increase 
investments  in  physical  capital  does  not  have  sufficiently  robust  empirical 
support. It is not the case that international aid turns into investments, nor that the 
latter favour growth. Hence, given the uncertainty concerning the channel through 
which  aid  can  foster  growth,  some  studies  discussed  in  the  next  section  have 
estimated  reduced  forms  by  directly  examining  the  relation  between  aid  and 
growth. 
 
1.3. The relationship between aid and growth  
 
Aid-growth models have been specified in various ways (see e.g. Papanek, 
1972;  Massell  et  al.,  1972;  Voivodas,  1973;  Bornschier  et  al.,  1978;  Mosley, 
Hudson and Horrel, 1987). In many studies, the specification is the typical growth 
accounting approach where a term relative to aid effectiveness replaces the term 
relative to convergence. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008 and 2009) consider 543 
regressions of growth on aid. Only 38% of these regressions find a positive and 
significant aid/growth elasticity. If instead the 68 best regressions in the literature 
are considered, the percentage rises to 46%. Moreover, in the meta-regression on 
such  studies  the  coefficient  associated  with  aid  is  slightly  positive  but  not 
significant. Another group of studies (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard, Hansen 
and Tarp, 2004) show the existence of a positive relationship between aid and 
growth, with decreasing returns (medicine models). The underlying hypothesis is 
that of the decreasing marginal productivity of the factors, as in the Solow model, 
applied to aid considered as a production factor (see  also Hadjimichael et al., 
1995; Durbarry et al., 1998; McGillivray, 2005). 
On  examining  the  variance  among  the  coefficients  in  empirical  studies, 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008 and 2009) report that it is greater than expected 
in the case of a random distribution of the results around a single average. This 
suggests the presence of ‘subgroups’ of regressions with different averages, which 
supports the conditionality hypothesis (aid is favourable to growth in a context   8 
with  specific  features:  see  Section  3).  Also  Radelet,  Clemens  and  Bhavnani 
(2004) stress the conditionality connected with features internal or external to the 
country receiving the aid. A large part of the literature concentrates on the internal 
characteristics:  the  quality  of  policies  (Burnside  and  Dollar,  1997),  of  the 
institutions (Burnside and Dollar, 2004), the presence of totalitarian governments 
(Isham, Kaufmann and Pritchett 1995, Islam, 2003), geographical location in the 
tropics (Dalgaard et al., 2004). The external characteristics instead concern the 
modes in which the aid is granted and the practices of the donors: for instance, 
bureaucratized  agencies  with  complex  procedures  cause  aid  effectiveness  to 
diminish, and multilateral aid is considered more effective than bilateral aid.  
An  alternative  approach  examines  the  aid/growth  relation  by  distinguishing 
among different types of aid. Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) emphasise 
that the approach used in many studies (based on five-year averages of growth 
rates  and  aid  flows,  lagged  if  necessary)  is  appropriate  only  for  verifying  the 
effect of what they call “short-tem aid”, that is, aid for infrastructures and for 
direct support to production sectors (around 53% of all aid). On isolating aid of 
this kind, Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani find an aid/growth relationship which is 
positive and much stronger than that estimated by studies that use aggregate aid. 
The factors that seem to influence aid effectiveness are therefore numerous, 
and  they  range  from  the  aid-granting  practices  themselves  to  policies  and  the 
quality of the institutions of the receiving countries. This suggests not only the 
non-existence of general recipes for growth valid in all contexts, but also that 
strong  complementarities  may  exist  among  a  country’s  economic,  social  and 
institutional dimensions. Before this strand in the literature is examined in more 
detail,  the  next  section  considers  the  effectiveness  of  the  other  grand  policy 
proposed in the post-war period to favour growth: investment in human capital. 
 
2. Education, human capital and growth 
 
The second grand policy proposed in the post-war period to favour the growth 
of the undeveloped countries was that of increasing human capital by means of 
large-scale  educational  programmes.  “People  with more education have higher 
wages. This is probably the second (after Engel's law) most well-established fact 
in  economics”  (Pritchett  2001,  p.  368).  The  conviction  that  education  –  the 
fundamental  dimension  of  human  capital  –  increases  labour  productivity  and 
fosters growth made schooling one of the main struts of the public anti-poverty 
growth policies (Easterly, 2001): “effective educational policies are a first-best 
poverty reduction strategy” (Gundlach et al. 2002, p. 92). 
The period between 1960 and the early 2000s saw an explosion of schooling. 
In 1990, the rate of enrolment at primary schools reached 100% in most countries 
of the world apart from those of sub-Saharan Africa. Rates of enrolment at the 
other  levels  of  schooling  also  significantly  improved  .  In  general,  the  rate  of 
enrolment  at  secondary  school  more  than  quadrupled  between  1960  and  2002   9 
(from  16%  to  67%);  the  African  countries  recorded  an  eightfold  increase, 
although they still remained well below the average (with 28% of enrolments). In 
the same period, the rate of enrolment in further or university education in the 
developing countries rose from 2% in 1960 to 13% in 2002 (Figure 2). The data 
are taken from Szirmai (2005) and they are slightly different from those cited by 
other authors (see Easterly 2001). Nevertheless, the direction and the intensity of 
the change have been substantially the same. 
Yet  increased  schooling  has  not  had  the  strong  impact  in  terms  of  growth 
which  was  expected.  This  difference  between  expectations  and  the  reality  has 
generated  a  large  number  of  empirical  studies  on  the  relationship  between 
education and growth, and identification of the problems still unresolved in the 
correct measurement of that relationship. 
 
2.1. Human capital and growth: the theoretical hypotheses 
 
From the theoretical point of view there are three main mechanisms through 
which human capital directly affects growth. The first is that of formal education 
(considered as a crucial dimension of human capital) and learning on the job, 
which enhance individual skills and therefore increase productivity (Arrow, 1962; 
Mankiw,  Romer  and  Weil,  1992).  The  second  is  the  mechanism  whereby 
education  increases  a  economy’s  innovative  capacity  and  thus  fosters  growth 
(Lucas,  1988;  Romer,  1989;  Aghion  and  Howitt,  1998).  Thirdly,  education 
facilitates  the  diffusion  and  transmission  of  the  knowledge  necessary  to 
understand  new  processes  and  new  technologies  (Nelson  and  Phelps,  1966; 
Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005).  
The model developed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) – an extension of 
Solow’s model – embodied the first hypothesis and added human capital as a 
further factor in the production function (augmented Solow model). A proportion 
of  saving  is  allocated,  not  to  the  accumulation  of  physical  capital,  but  to  the 
accumulation of human capital and, given a certain propensity to save, the steady 
state  level  of  income  will  be  greater  than  in  a  model  which  does  not  include 
human capital. 
In  Lucas’s  endogenous  growth  model  (1988),  the  accumulation  of  human 
capital increased knowledge via learning through schooling and learning through 
training, and, as stated by the second hypothesis, the investment in knowledge 
produced an increase in labour productivity and led to positive growth rates in the 
long  period.  Lucas  replaced  the  technological  change  in  Solow’s  model  with 
human  capital  accumulation  as  the  engine  of  growth.  Finally,  the  interaction 
between physical capital and human capital was assumed as the key hypothesis in 
models of endogenous growth. Arrow (1962) had already proposed a model of 
endogenous  growth  in  which  human  capital  grows  through  learning  by  doing. 
Such learning is a function of the investment accumulated in physical capital, in 
particular  that  employed  in  the  production  of  capital  goods,  and  in  its  turn  it   10
produces improvements in the new capital goods produced. As Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2003) put it: “A firm that increases physical capital learns simultaneously 
how to produce more efficiently” (p. 213).  
Alongside  these  direct  effects,  the  literature  has  emphasised  other  channels 
through  which  human  capital  may  affect  growth.  Already  in  Lucas’s  model 
(1988), human capital not only affected individual productivity (“internal effect of 
human capital”), but also had a “external effect” whereby the average aggregate 
level of human capital influences the productivity of all the production factors: 
“human capital accumulation is a social activity, involving groups of people in a 
way that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital” (Lucas 1988, 
p.  19).  The  accumulation  of  human  capital  produces  externalities:  individual 
productivity  depends  on  the  local  stock  of  human  capital  in  the  environment 
where it operates. Other externalities concern the fact that schooling and increased 
knowledge  create  social  capital  and  trust  relations,  and  they  indirectly  affect 
economic  performance.  Education  is  generally  associated  with  a  decrease  in 
crime,  with  more  aware  and  better  informed  political  and  social  participation 
(Sen,  1999),  with  greater  social  cohesion,  and  with  closer  concern  for  the 
environment (see OECD 1998 for a survey). Finally, the accumulation of human 
capital affects important choices such as health and fertility decisions. 
 
2.2. Human capital and growth: the empirical results 
 
The  empirical  results  of  aggregate  studies  on  the  relationship  between  the 
education level and growth are conflicting. Many studies conducted in the 1980s 
and  early  1990s  enthusiastically  stressed  the  importance  of  human  capital  in 
explaining the Solow residual in the economic growth of the Western countries.
2 
Psacharopoulos  (1985),  in  a  survey  of  29  studies  of  growth  accounting  type, 
emphasised  education’s  positive  contribution  to  growth  (from  a  low  1%  for 
Mexico to a high 23% in Ghana). Human capital also seems to be associated with 
an increase in levels of investment in physical capital (Barro, 1991; Gemmell, 
1996; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994).  
A second group of studies are more critical. Lau, Jamison and Louat (1991), in 
a  cross-country  model  based  on  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  (58 
countries), found that education had negative effects on growth in Africa and the 
Middle East, insignificant ones in southern Asia and Latin America, and positive 
                                                 
2 The first studies used indexes of adult literacy (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Romer, 1990) or 
school enrolment rates (Barro 1991; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Levine and Renelt, 1992) as 
proxies for human capital. Further attempts were based on estimates of average years of schooling 
in the population made using perpetual inventory methods or similar (Lau, Jamison and Louat, 
1991;  Nehru,  Swanson  and  Dubey,  1995;  see  for  a  survey  Wössmann,  2003). Barro  and  Lee 
(2001) have extended the analysis proposing an internationally comparable database on average 
years of schooling.   11
ones only in East Asia. Jovanovic, Lach and Lavy (1992) obtained similar results 
on a sample of developing countries. A first factor that may explain this difference 
among findings is that the impact of education on growth is not homogeneous 
among  countries,  but  instead  depends  on  a  country’s  level  of  development. 
Sianesi  and  Van  Reenen  (2003)  showed  that,  in  the  advanced  countries,  it  is 
mainly tertiary education which favours growth, owing to collateral investment in 
new  technologies.  Krueger  and  Lindahl  (2001)  instead  showed  that,  in  the 
developing countries, investing in basic education is more effective. 
A second factor to be considered is the difference between the effects due to 
the initial stock of human capital and those due to its variation over time. Krueger 
and Lindhal (2001) reported that the literature based on the ‘levels’ of human 
capital  (as  initial  stock)  generally  obtained  positive  results.  Nevertheless,  if 
changes in the stock were considered (the ‘differences approach’) non-significant 
or  even  negative  results  were  obtained.  Benhabib  and  Spiegel  (1994),  for 
example, found a positive effect of the initial level of human capital on growth 
and a negative effect on growth of variations in the years of schooling. Nor did 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) obtain a significant result when they adopted a 
specification based on the differences in the stock of human capital. 
Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003) underlined that it is necessary to distinguish 
between the effects of education on productivity (with specifications that recall 
those  of  the  extended  Solow  model)  and  those  on  the  growth  rate  of  output 
(endogenous growth theories). They stated that “the evidence that human capital 
increases productivity is compelling” (p. 157),  while the results of the second 
branch  in  the  literature  may  be  seriously  distorted  by  problems  with  data  and 
specification of the model, although they believed that the relationship existed and 
was positive. 
The  problems  of  measuring  human  capital  and  data  quality  are  indeed 
enormous.  The  concept  of  human  capital  is  broad  and  comprises,  besides  the 
education ‘embodied’ in the individual, also experiences and acquired or innate 
aptitudes,  or  ones  which  may  affect  the  individual’s  labour  productivity  and 
determine his/her remuneration. The concept of human capital is multi-faceted 
and powerful, which entails that its measurement is neither immediate nor easy. In 
effect, if human capital has several dimensions and comprises individual, familial 
and relational characteristics and country-effects, reducing its measurement to the 
mere  amount  of  formal  education  is  restrictive.  Recent  empirical  studies  have 
sought to respond to this criticism by controlling for the characteristics of the 
familial and social context. Natural experiments (for instance using data on twins) 
have  been  attempted  in  order  to  control  for  latent  variables,  such  as  innate 
qualities or the education received in the family. Nevertheless, owing to a lack of 
data (on the ‘quality’ of the education or on the abilities resulting from causes 
other than education) and of methodologies with which to analyse unobserved 
variables, the problems are far from being solved.   12
Nor do the problems of data goodness and comparability diminish if the focus 
is solely on formal education (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). Already at the 
level  of  micro  analysis,  difficulties  are  caused  by  the  poor  quality  of 
questionnaires or the absence of information on repeat school years. The problems 
increase considerably when attempts are made to estimate the stock of human 
capital at the level of economies as a whole. De la Fuente and Domenech (2002) 
highlight the unreliability of the data available on OECD countries. Krueger and 
Lindhal (2001) criticise the data used in the growth regressions by Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1994) and by Pritchett (2001) on the grounds that they are devoid of real 
information. Cohen and Soto (2007), using OECD and UNESCO data, report a 
marked and positive contribution of education to growth. Other authors emphasise 
that quantitative data on education are not sufficient; it is instead necessary to 
introduce  quality  indicators  in  order  to  avoid  distortions  in  the  estimates. 
Hanushek and Wössmann (2007), in a study on the quality of education, point out 
serious estimation errors in the study by Cohen and Soto. 
As regards estimation of the externalities associated with education, a strand in 
the empirical literature seeks to evaluate the externalities on individual wages by 
isolating the impact on them of the average level of education in the individual’s 
city or state of residence. Rauch (1993) identified the presence of externalities on 
wages  in  a  study  on  conurbations  in  North  America.  Acemoglu  and  Angrist 
(1999) found positive but non-significant coefficients for the regressor relative to 
variation in the average stock of education in the area (American census data for 
the period 1960-80). The results were instead significant if the stock data were 
used,  although  the  coefficient  was  rather  low  (Acemoglu  and  Angrist,  2001). 
Again using American data, Ciccone and Peri (2006) did not find evidence of 
positive externalities of education on wages at city or state level. Sianesi and Van 
Reenen  (2003)  analysed  both  externalities  with effects  on  productivity  and  on 
wages and those affecting the lives and behaviour of individuals. As regards the 
former, they compared macro approaches that seek to identify the ‘social returns’ 
on  education  with  micro  results  on  private  returns.  They  concluded  that  the 
returns measured at macro level may be greater or smaller than those estimated at 
private level because possible positive externalities of the average level of human 
capital may be partially or wholly off-set by the public costs of education, which 
are higher than private ones. There is substantial agreement in literature on the 
existence of indirect externalities. Various studies show that, in the developing 
countries, education –  in particular of females – is negatively correlated with the 
birth  rate  (Schultz,  1989;  Behrman,  1990)  and  with  the  infant  mortality  rate 
(Barro, 1991; Barro and Lee, 1994; Glewwe, 2000). In Africa, a 10% increase in 
the rate of female literacy reduces the infant mortality rate by 10%. By contrast, 
change in the level of male literacy does not have effects of this kind. Similar 
studies in Thailand, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco and Peru have reached the same 
conclusions (World Bank, 1993). Helliwell and Putnam (1999) concluded that the 
effect of the level of education on social relationships is very general and has 
major weight.   13
 
2.3. The quality of education 
 
The contrasting empirical results on the relationship between education and 
growth at macro level raise the question of what factors may block the effects of 
education on the evolution of aggregate output. Pritchett (2001) underlines three 
specific  conditions  in  developing  countries:  the  labour  market,  the  education 
system, and institutions (for the latter see section 3.2).  
As regards the labour market, if a higher education makes it possible to acquire 
rent positions which favour redistributive phenomena for the educated class, there 
will  be  little  consequences  on  production.  For  example,  in  many  developing 
countries, the public sector absorbs the increasing supply of educated labour in 
response to political pressures (Gelb, Knight and Sabot, 1991). More generally, 
the demand for skilled labour depends on the economy’s sectoral composition, on 
its  degree  of  openness,  and  on  the  production  system’s  rate  of  technological 
change.  Schultz  (1988),  for  instance,  noted  that  the  benefits  of  education  are 
almost  nil  in  the  agricultural  sector.  As  a  consequence,  demand  for  educated 
labour may be stagnant in developing countries. 
As regards the education system, criticism is directed at its quality, which may 
be so low that it does not increase the individual’s abilities and productivity. The 
problem of the quality of education is serious: in a recent review of studies on the 
relationship  between  education  and  growth,  Hanushek  and  Wössmann  (2007) 
conclude  that  “educational  quality,  particularly  in  assessing  policies  related  to 
developing countries, is THE key issue” (p.1). Many of the studies previously 
cited  were  aware  that  the  quality  of  the  education  system  affects  work 
performance and  growth. However, the variables used to estimate the level of 
education were quantitative (for instance years of schooling). The reason of this is 
mainly the difficulty in finding suitable indicators for the quality of education. A 
first approach, which was used especially by studies in the 1990s, measures the 
latter on the basis of the quantity of investments in schools: teaching materials, 
facilities, number of students per teacher, or the share of GDP spent on education  
(Psacharopoulos, 1994; Hanushek, 1996). These input indicators are rather rough 
approximations of the ‘quality’ of the school system. A more recent approach uses 
the average performances of students in ability tests as a proxy for the quality of 
the  school  system.  The  diffusion  of  data  on  the  quality  of  educational 
performances  has  made  it  possible  to  use  this  method  for  a  large  group  of 
countries,  not  only  in  the  OECD  area,  but  also  for  developing  countries.  As 
regards the effects of the quality of education on growth, Hanushek and Kimko 
(2000) found that adding qualitative indexes to quantitative ones increased the 
variance  explained  in  the  per  capita  GDP  of  countries  from  33%  to  73%. 
Moreover, the coefficient associated with quantitative indicators of human capital 
became low, and in numerous specifications not significant. Lee and Lee (1995) 
and Barro and Lee (2001) examined the relation between indexes of cognitive   14
ability and growth, obtaining similar results. This is the finding of many other 
studies  evidencing  that  the  quality  aspect  is  dominant  (Bosworth  and  Collins, 
2003; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2005). 
The importance of cognitive skills has been stressed also by numerous micro 
studies  relative  to  the  developed  countries,  from  which  a  strong  correlation 
emerges between educational performance and performance on the labour market; 
the  impact  of  cognitive  skills  is  even  greater  in  the  developing  countries. 
Moreover,  there  is  evidence  that  the  skills  acquired  at  school  increase  in 
importance during the working life. For a summary of studies which report this 
effect see Table 3, compiled by Hanushek and Wössmann (2007). This deals with 
studies based on data panels which follow students after they have entered the 
labour market. They highlight the marked effect of cognitive skills on individual 
wages. 
 
Table 3 - Relative increase in pay due to a growth in cognitive skills (scores on tests) equal to one 
standard deviation 
Country  Study  Estimated effects 
Ghana  Glewwe (1996)  0.21**/0.3** (government) 
0.14/0.17 (private) 
Ghana  Jolliffe (1998)  0,05/0,007 
Kenya  Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot (1985);  
Knight and Sabot (1990)  
0.19**/0.22** 
Pakistan  Alderman, Behrman, Ross and Sabot (1996)   0.12/0.28* 
Pakistan  Behrman, Ross and Sabot (2008)   0.25 
South Africa  Moll (1998)  0.34**/0.48** 
Tanzania  Boissiere,  Knight  and  Sabot  (1985);  Knight 
and Sabot (1990)  
0.07/0.13* 
Source: Hanushek & Wössmann (2007). 
 
However, indexes of cognitive ability capture the effect of all factors affecting 
the educational performance and not only of those that are linked to the quality of 
the educational system. Hanushek and Wössmann (2007), for example, stress that 
score differences in school tests depend not only on schools’ quality but also on 
other variables such the family context or innate abilities. Furthermore, school 
learning  does  not  depend  solely  on  individual  abilities  but  also  on  those  of 
schoolmates (peer effects: Hanushek et al., 2003). Robertson and Symons (2003) 
find that peer effects may be important, and that indicators of school quality prove 
to  be  of  little  significance  if  controlled  for.  So,  if  we  want  to  summarise  the 
findings, we could say that good educational performances are good for growth 
but  that  we  still  know  very  little  about  what  is  crucial  for  good  educational 
performances. 
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3. The causes of aid ineffectiveness and conditionality 
 
The resources made available by development aid have not had the impact 
expected. The literature has divided the causes of this failure into two classes of 
phenomena: the first relates to the nature itself of growth problems, namely the 
presence  of  complementarities  and  interdependences;  the  second  relates  to 
inopportune  behaviour  by  agents  (bad  policies,  corruption,  rent-seeking).  This 
section briefly analyses the results of this literature. 
 
3.1. Complementarities and externalities 
  
If  technological  change  is  the  main  determinant  of  growth,  why  have  poor 
countries not adopted advanced technologies? Technological backwardness may 
be an advantage because it enables a country to jump directly to the technological 
frontier by virtue of imitation and the inflow of direct investments from foreign 
countries (Borensztein, de Gregorio and Lee, 1998; Blomström, Lipsey and Zejan, 
1994).  But  it  may  turn  into  a  disadvantage  if  the  ability  to  use  the  new 
technologies  depends  on  homogeneity  among  the  technological  levels  of  the 
various sectors; in other words, if forms of complementarity  and indivisibility 
exist.  People  accumulate  skills  where  there  are  advanced  technologies; 
entrepreneurs invest in  new technologies where there are skilled workers. The 
complementarity between technology and skilled labour creates complementarity 
among workers: the productivity of a worker depends not only on his/her skills 
and qualifications but also on those of other workers (matching). According to 
Mankiw (1995), the absence of flows of capital to countries in which there is no 
skilled labour is due to low returns on capital. Investments in physical and human 
capital tend to flow to countries richer in knowledge and offering greater returns 
(Acemoglu,  1997).  As  we  have  already  noted,  in  developing  countries,  more 
education is very often associated with unemployment, owing to a lack of demand 
for skilled  labour (Krueger and Lindhal 2001, Al-Samarrai and Bennell 2007). 
These  complementarities  may  give  rise  to  coordination  failures  and  low-level 
equilibria (Hoff, 2000). 
But there are cases in which coordination among these different dimensions 
has been successful. For example, the good endowment of human capital in East 
Asia  has  enabled  those  economies  to  acquire  and  exploit  technological 
knowledge, and to achieve higher productivity (World Bank, 1991). Benhabib and 
Spiegel  (1994)  found  that  the  accumulation  of  human  capital  has  positive 
externalities which facilitate the adoption of new technologies (as also reported by 
Nelson and Phelps, 1966). Nevertheless, coordination failures are common, and 
they may prevent growth. 
 There  are  then  the  negative  collateral  effects  exerted  by  aid  on  the 
competitiveness of countries. The flow of incoming aid may lead to overvaluation   16
of  the  national  currency,  with  consequences  on  export  capacity  (Rajan  and 
Subramanian,  2005).  Another  collateral  effect  of  aid  is  its  influence  on  the 
evolution of the institutional system. It is not clear, in fact, whether aid favours 
better policy-making or whether it encourages corruption and bad governance. It 
has been found that aid produces forms of graft in ethnically divided societies 
(Svensson 2000). Bauer raised the problem of such collateral effects as early as 
the 1970s, and he has returned to it in one of his recent papers (Bauer 1991)
3. 
 
3.2. Governments, policies and the institutional system 
 
The second class of phenomena blamed for aid ineffectiveness comprises the 
implementation  of  bad  policies,  a  mismatch  between  the  interests  of  the 
bureaucracy  and  the  common  interest  (rent  seeking),  and  the  poor  quality  of 
institutions.  Consideration  of  these  phenomena  has  given  rise  to  the  idea  of 
conditional aid (see subsection 3.3). 
 
3.2.1. Bad policies 
 
Inappropriate  government  policies  may  prevent  growth.  Examples  of  such 
policies are the maintenance of high inflation rates, a high black market premium, 
negative real interest rates, large deficits in public balances, restrictions on free 
trade, excessive bureaucracy, and inadequate public services. 
In Jamaica, the impossibility of purchasing US dollars produced a large black 
market for the American currency in the 1990s and gave rise to a tax on exports. 
In Ghana, for almost two decades the black market premium was above 40% and 
reached levels above 4000% in the early 1980s. In Guyana between 1985 and 
1990,  the  black  market  premium  exceeded  200%  (Fardmanesh  and  Douglas, 
2003). There are numerous cases of countries in which the real interest rate has 
been negative: Bolivia between 1982 to 1984 (-75%); Ghana between 1976 and 
1983 (-35%); Poland between 1981 and 1982 (-33%). In all these cases the growth 
of GDP in the same periods was negative (Easterly, 2001). On the correlation 
between negative interest rates and negative growth see King and Levine (1992), 
Gelb (1991), Easterly (1993), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
Inadequate public services are also bad policies. In Uganda, in the second half 
of the 1990s, the water supply was interrupted on 33 days on average per year, 
                                                 
3 Ambiguous results about effectiveness may also be affected by endogeneity problems. Aid may 
depend on growth. Roodman (2007) has shown that the relationship may be negative: countries 
which grow less receive more aid. This inverse relationship is often recognized but ignored in the 
specification of models (as in Burnside and Dollar 1997). The problem of endogeneity has raised 
the question of whether there exist deeper-lying latent variables which determine growth. This 
concerns the literature on the deep determinants of growth, which is not analysed here.   17
77%  of  enterprises  had  private  waste  dumps,  and  only  31%  of  business 
correspondence was delivered by the post office (Reinikka and Svensson, 1999). 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) estimated that an increase of investments in transport 
and  communications  equal  to  1%  of  GDP  would  increase  the  growth  rate  by 
0.6%; and spending on the maintenance of infrastructures, roads for example, has 
high returns (Gyamfi, 1992). Yet public decision-makers often appear insensitive 
to  such  incentives.  Finally,  it  may  be  rational  for  a  country  to  ‘accept’  being 
backward (rational underdevelopment: Desmet and Ortín, 2007) in exchange for 
subsidies and transfers from the more developed economies, especially if the aid 
is appropriated by the elites. 
 
3.2.2. Corruption and “bad institutions” 
 
Defining corruption is difficult. According to the economic approach of the 
Public Choice School (Buchanan et al., 1980, Rowley et al., 1989), the greater the 
intervention by the government (and public spending), the more the inefficiency 
and the corruption. However, the argument that ‘big spenders’ are more inefficient 
and corrupt has been disputed (Hopkin, 2002), because the efficiency of public 
intervention varies greatly independently of the level of public spending. Very 
corrupt countries may have low levels of public spending precisely because high 
corruption  prevents  the  state  from  establishing  an  efficient  tax  system  (Tanzi, 
2000). Finally, temporary factors that increase corruption (an internal conflict, an 
environmental  disaster  that  involves  the  nation)  may  have  permanent  effects. 
Once  the  collective  reputation  has  been  compromised,  it  proves  difficult  to 
reconstruct (Bardhan 1997). The factors that influence the level of the corruption 
are both economic (e.g. the black market premium or restrictions on free trade: 
Ades and DiTella, 1999) and non-economic (e.g. the quality of the institutions, 
and ethnic differentiation: see Knack and Keefer, 1995 and Svensson, 2000). 
There  is  consensus  in  the  literature  that  corruption  has  direct  and  indirect 
negative effects on investments and growth (Boycko, Schleifer and Vishny 1995, 
Mauro  1995  and  1998,  Kaufmann  1997,  Tanzi  and  Davoodi  1997,  Gupta,  De 
Mello and Sharan 2001, Jain 2001, Aidt 2003, Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004) and 
on the performance of businesses (see Fisman and Svensson 2007 for the Uganda 
case). Corruption distorts investment decisions and makes trade openness more 
difficult. But there are empirical studies which conclude that although corruption 
has negative effects if it is too high, a certain level of corruption may increase 
growth (Méndez and Sepúlveda 2006). In some countries, bureaucratic corruption 
is a factor which accelerates procedures conducive to growth (the so-called ‘East 
Asia paradox’: Rock and Bonnett 2004). 
Another  aspect  linked  to  corruption  that  can  distort  productive  decisions  is 
rent-seeking by institutions or individual actors. For instance, the imposition of 
taxes (formal and informal) on agricultural production destined for the market and   18
export  may  induce  producers  in  rural  areas  to  engage  solely  in  subsistence 
farming, which in itself is less profitable (Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, 1993).  
Dealing with the problem of corruption is not easy. The remedies suggested 
range among simplification of fiscal and administrative systems, the elimination 
of government subsidies, competition among different government agencies for 
supply  of  the  same  service,  the  appropriate  application  of  anti-corruption 
legislation, and the privatization of public industry (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Many 
of  these  actions  require  credible  monitoring  and  sanctioning  mechanisms;  yet 
many suspect that also the institution tasked with such monitoring would be liable 
to corruption. There is also a huge stream of literature that tries to verify if aid 
effectiveness  depends  on  some  type  of  institution  and  its  quality  (democracy: 
Svensson, 1999, Kosack, 2003; trade rules: Tebouel and Moustier 2001; quality of 
the institutions: Collier and Dehn, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002). 
 
3.2.3. Ethnic-social polarization  
 
Social  polarization  and  fragmentation  negatively  affect  growth  in 
underdeveloped countries especially because they decrease trust (Montalvo and 
Reynal-Queyrol, 2005; Keefer and Knack 2002), reduce investments, and increase 
public  consumption.  Divided  societies  have  incentives  to  redistribute  income 
rather than promote development. The consequence is the greater likelihood of 
internal  conflicts,  government  policies  not  targeted  on  growth,  and  over-
exploitation  of  common  resources.  The  almost  total  destruction  of  cocoa 
production in Ghana – which represented 19% of GDP in the 1950s and only 3% 
in the 1980s – was due to ethnic conflict (Easterly 2001). Social polarization is 
associated with marked inequalities among the incomes of social groups (Alesina 
and  Rodrik,  1994,  Persson  and  Tabellini,  1994,  Perotti,  1996,  Clark,  1995, 
Deininger  and  Squire,  1998),  with  negative  consequences  on  growth.  A  final 
aspect to consider is the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and the quality 
of  the  institutions.  Countries  with  strong  ethnic  fragmentation,  but  with  good 
institutions,  more  easily  avoid  violence,  poverty,  and  mere  redistributive 
behaviour.  Rupasinga,  Goetz  and  Freshwater  (2002)  found,  in  the  case  of  the 
USA, that if ethnic diversity does not produce inequalities and a social climate of 




3.3.1 Intervention in governance by the international institutions  
 
The realization that bad policies and incorrect behaviour hamper growth and 
render aid ineffective has induced the international aid institutions and donors to 
impose forms of ‘good government’ on beneficiary countries, and doing so with   19
interventions that at least partially affect those countries’ sovereignty. Intervention 
by international institutions in state-level policies and governance institutions is 
the outcome of a process started during the post-war period. At the end of the 
Second World War, countries –  the newly-independent ones especially – were 
particularly  jealous  of  their  sovereignty.  Nevertheless,  during  the  1970s,  the 
international financial institutions began to suggest that countries in difficulties 
should  adopt  (short-term)  measures  of  monetary  and  fiscal  discipline  and 
restructure the state’s role in the market. There thus began a slow erosion of the 
sovereignty  of  states.  Interference  in  state  sovereignty  also  increased  in  the 
political  sphere.  Non-Western  countries  applied  pressure  for  sanctions  to  be 
imposed  on  white  minority  governments  practising  forms  of  apartheid  (South 
Africa, Rhodesia); but at the same time it was impossible to prevent denunciation 
of regimes like those of Idi Amin in Uganda, Pol Pot in Cambodia, or Duvallier in 
Haiti. The United Nations began to monitor elections in countries with suspect 
political reputations (Huntington 1991). Humanitarian action on the occasion of 
conflicts  further  extended  intervention  by  international  forces  in  the  domestic 
affairs of countries. As the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros-
Ghali, said, “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed” 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992). 
Increased intervention in the sphere of economic and political action shifted 
attention from ‘good policies’ to governance; a process highlighted by the change 
from  the  Washington  Consensus  (Williamson,  1990)  to  the  Augmented 
Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus was a set of economic policy 
recommendations;  the  Augmented  Washington  Consensus  added 
recommendations concerning the behaviour of governments and states, the quality 
of institutions, and the aims of economic-social policies. The term ‘governance’ 
denotes the structure and workings of a political and institutional system. In a 
system of good governance, fundamental rights, for instance property rights, are 
guaranteed; macro policies ensure stability; there is an absence of corruption; and 
markets  operate  efficiently.  By  contrast,  bad  governance  is  defined  as  the 
“personalisation  of  power,  lack  of  human  rights,  endemic  corruption  and  un-
elected and unaccountable governments” (Bøås, 1998). The concept is a complex 
one,  and  it  is  often  reduced  to  those  base  institutions  of  the  West  such  as 
multipartyism, parliamentarism, and separation between the judicial and political 
systems
4. The list of actions required of states, governments, and civil society for 
good governance has often been defined in rigid terms without consideration of 
the specific circumstances of  individual countries.  
 
                                                 
4 Numerous variables are used in empirical studies to define good governance, and they are often 
derive from date mining operations, rather than from clarification of the concept.   20
3.3.2. Conditional loans 
 
One device used to steer countries towards good governance is the issuing of 
conditional  loans.  The  first  generation  of  such  loans  was  connected  with  the 
strong  foreign  indebtedness  of  certain  countries,  for  which  the  international 
institutions  decided  to  link  (in  this  case  for  debt  management)  to  reforms  of 
economic policy. These took the name of ‘structural adjustment loans’. 
Easterly (2001) cites cases in which conditional loans had positive effects on 
the growth, for instance Ghana (1984-1994) and Thailand (in approximately the 
same  decade).  Nevertheless,  on  average,  the  results  have  not  been  positive. 
Several studies on conditional loans have shown their negative relationship with 
economic growth (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000). Conditional loans have often 
been granted to countries with difficult initial conditions, high inflation, budget 
deficits,  large  black  market  premiums,  negative  interest  rates,  and  corruption. 
Between  1980  and  1994,  Zambia  received  twelve  adjustment  loans  but 
nevertheless maintained two-digit inflation even though a reduction in inflation 
was one of the conditions for receiving the loans. The rule not to grant loans to 
countries with high budget deficits or high  negative real interest rates has often 
not been respected. Structural adjustment loans have often been granted to corrupt 
governments, which had incentives to remain such once they had obtained the 
loans; and cases of moral hazard in bargaining on conditional loans have been 
frequent (Svensson 1997, Gibson et al. 2005). Many governments have chosen to 
reduce their deficits by means of short-run interventions, by cutting investments in 
infrastructures  or  selling  off  state-owned  enterprises,  by  requiring  advanced 
payments of taxes, or by subsidizing themselves out of pension funds. These were 
measures which reduced the current deficit, so that the country could comply with 
the  conditions  attached  to  the  loans.  But  they  only  postponed  the  problem  to 
subsequent periods. The donors often failed to consider the sustainability of the 
reforms undertaken by the governments of countries, either because these were 
former colonies, or because they had a strategic international role which made it 
convenient to grant loans even when the conditions were not respected (World 
Bank, 1998). 
Criticisms of conditional aid are based on the argument that political problems 
and moral hazard make it difficult to enforce the conditions and to steer countries 
towards  serious  structural  reforms.  A  more  radical  position  states  that  such 
policies are not just ineffective, but wrong. Rodrik (2007) maintains that the best 
performances  have  been  achieved  by  economies  which  have  not  followed  the 
orthodoxy  of  structural  reforms.  China  and  Vietnam,  for  example,  have 
implemented  ‘two-track’  reforms  (liberalization  in  certain  sectors,  centralized 
planning in others), without complying with the trade rules proposed first by the 
GATT and then by the WTO. India has undertaken reforms in slow and gradual 
manner.  On  the  other  hand,  many  Latin-American  countries  have  adopted  the 
standard  agenda  of  reforms,  obtaining  less  good  or  negative  results.  Rodrik   21
concludes that the ability to suggest ex ante what reforms to adopt is limited, and 
that giving advice based on a list of ‘correct’ reforms may yield unwanted results. 
 
3.3.3. The effectiveness of conditional loans in empirical research 
 
Various  early  studies  showed  that  aid  had  a  positive  impact  on  growth  in 
countries with good policies and a negative impact in countries with bad policies; 
on  average,  the  effect  was  nil.  This  result  is  interesting  because  besides 
representing an elegant solution to the micro-macro paradox raised by Mosley 
(Mosley et al., 1987)
5, it had immediate political consequences: aid should be 
given only to countries with good policies (Collier and Dollar, 2001 and 2002). 
The meta-analysis by Doucouliagos and Paldam considered 22 studies on good 
policy models, finding that the aggregate coefficient of interaction between the 
policy indicator and help was positive but very low. Doucouliagos and Paldam 
concluded  that  a  good  policy  environment  does  not  significantly  increase  the 
effectiveness  of  aid.  However,  the  size  of  the  sample,  the  type  of  estimation 
method used, and specification of the model affect the coefficient of interaction. 
Also the affiliation of the authors is important: researchers at the World Bank 
obtain results more favourable to the effectiveness of aid than do researchers at 
other institutions. 
One of the most influential works in this group of studies is that by Burnside 
and Dollar (1997, 2000). To test the hypothesis that aid is effective in the presence 
of good policies, Burnside and Dollar used an aid*policy interaction variable. The 
quality of policies was measured by the Sachs-Warner index (a weighted average 
of indicators of the budget balance, inflation and trade openness), and control was 
made for a series of characteristics such as the initial level of per capita income, 
ethnic  polarization,  regional  variables  and  a  measure  of  “financial  depth” 
(M2/PIL). Their results (see Table 4, taken from Harms and Lutz 2004) showed 
that the coefficient of the interaction term was positive and significant, while the 
coefficient relative only to the variable ‘aid’ was negative and non-significant. 
Hansen and Tarp (2000) used Burnside and Dollar’s good policies indicator 
but added a quadratic term for aid. They found that the interaction variable was no 
longer significant, while the quadratic variable (aid has decreasing returns, and 
there exists an ‘optimum dose’ of aid). In response to this criticism, Collier and 
Dollar (2002) reprised Hansen and Tarp’s model with the quadratic term in aid, 
but  a  different  variable  to  define  the  quality  of  policies,  and  they  obtained 
opposite results: the quadratic variable was not significant, whereas the interaction 
variable was. 
                                                 
5 It is very difficult, according to Mosley et al. 1987), to establish any significant correlation 
between aid and growth rate of GNP in developing countries; however, at a micro level, agencies 
regularly report the success of most of their projects and programs. This is known as the micro-
macro paradox.   22
 
Table 4 – Aid, growth and conditionality 
Source  Burnside – 
Dollar (2000) 
Collier – 



















Aid squared    -0.02 
(1.60) 
  -0.57 
(2.02) 
 
































OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  OLS 
Period  1970-93  1974-97  1970-89  1970-
93 
1970-97 
Frequency  4-yearly  4-yearly  10-yearly  4-yearly  4-yearly 
N  270  349  112  270  345 
R-sq  0.39  0.37  --  --  0.33 
Note: the t-statistic is given under each coefficient in brackets. 
Source: Harms and Lutz (2004) 
 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) used the same specification as Burnside 
and Dollar, but they extended the data to the period 1970-1997 (Burnside and 
Dollar  had  used  data  for  the  period  1970-1993)  and  increased  the  number  of 
countries  in  the  sample.  They  found  (see  last  column  of  Table  4)  that  the 
coefficient of the interaction variable was negative and non-significant. Different 
specifications  of  the  Burnside  and  Dollar’s  model,  reported  in  Easterly  et  al. 
(2003) and in Roodman (2007) confirm that the relation between the interaction 
the aid*policy variable was fragile.  
Burnside and Dollar’s results depend on the inclusion of a large number of 
control variables and the reduction of the sample due to limited availability of 
data; but the most delicate point concerns the facts that different proxies for ‘good 
policies’ lead to different results. For instance, using the good policy indicators 
proposed by Kaufmann et al. (1999), Harms and Lutz (2003) found that aid has no 
impact  in  countries  with  an  institutional  environment  of  ‘average’  quality. 
Paradoxically,  the  impact  is  positive  in  countries  with  a  high  level  of 
bureaucratization, because in this case aid does not crowd out private investments, 
which  are  already  hindered  by  bureaucracy.  At  last,  according  to  Jensen  and 
Paldam (2003), also the “medicine models” are not robust to changes in the size 
of the sample. 
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4. The need to rethink the methodology 
 
4.1 The criticisms of Bourguignon and Sundberg 
 
Bourguignon  and  Sundberg  (2007)  criticise  the  methodology  used  in  the 
literature on aid effectiveness. They argue that the lack of convincing results is 
due  to  a  failure  to  carefully  consider  the  causal  linkage  between  the  two 
phenomena. Analysis has not borne in mind that this linkage is the ‘synthesis’ of a 
complex chain whose individual components should be identified and described. 
More specifically, the criticisms of Bourguignon and Sundberg are the following. 
Forms of aid are generally aggregated into an single category regardless of the 
purposes for which they have been granted. Often, however, aid is not granted for 
the  purpose  of  development  but  following  natural  disasters  or  with  political 
objectives. Furthermore empirical studies do not draw a clear distinction between 
the short and long period; they have problems with endogeneity in the aid/growth 
relationship;  and  they  do  not  control  for  specific  characteristics  of  countries 
(Bourguignon  and  Leipziger,  2006).  Finally,  the  multi-dimensionality  of 
development  objectives  (income,  poverty,  schooling,  health,  etc.)  further 
complicates the analysis. At times, used as growth regressors are variables which 
describe development and therefore express the same phenomenon as documented 
by growth.  
Dealing with these problems requires better understanding of the links between 
aid and the final outcomes. Bourguignon and Sundberg identify three such links. 
The first (working backwards) is the one which connects outcomes with policies. 
Outcomes  are  determined  by  policies:  for  example  macro  stability  affects 
investments and growth. A certain amount of knowledge about this causal link is 
yielded by economic research, but it should be analysed in greater detail. 
The  second  link  connects  government  policies  with  policy-making  at  local 
level.  This  is  the  problem  of  governance,  whose  quality  reflects  the  existing 
institutions. 
The third link is that between international donors and politicians and their 
actions. The donors influence political action through intervention in the political 
debate and through technical support. They also try to impose specific policies 
(conditionality), but they often do so with imperfect information about the local 
context, and above all imperfect control over the implementation of such policies. 
According  to  Bourguignon  and  Sundberg,  the  literature  already  furnishes 
sufficient  information  with  which  to  understand  how  each  link  contributes  to 
development outcomes. The effect of a macro climate ‘good’ for investments is 
sufficiently  well  known,  and  it  is  positive  (even  though  country-specific 
characteristics prevent generalizing). Knowledge is also becoming more precise at 
the  level  of  projects  due  to  evaluations  that  use  experimental  or  quasi-
experimental designs. It is important to increase the number of such evaluations,   24
although, according to Bourguignon and Sundberg it is an illusion to believe that 
evaluation is enough to direct aid to where it will be effective (as maintained by 
Banerjee, 2006 and Easterly, 2006). Firstly, not all interventions can be subject to 
rigorous  evaluation;  secondly,  applying  positively  evaluated  projects  or 
programmes  in  other  countries  may  have  unsatisfactory  results  because  of 
specificity  problems.  Finally,  many  policies  have  general  equilibrium  effects 
which evaluations ignore. 
The formulation of good policies depends on the system of governance. There 
is evidence of a positive linkage between good governance and good policies, but 
it is not easy to solve the problem of the direction of causality. This link of the 
chain is rarely considered and analysed separately: indicators of the quality of 
governance  are  often  directly  connected  with  the  outcomes  (Acemoglu  et  al., 
2005).  
The relationship between donors and politicians in the receiving  country  is 
often  conditioned  by  geopolitical  factors  (post-colonial  relations,  strategic 
interests)  or  ideological  ones:  liberalization  and  privatization  have  often  been 
demanded without taking account of the specific context. 
According to Bourguignon and Sundberg, it is important to define a new aid 
model based on two main features: the development strategy must be established 
and managed by the country (country ownership); and the donors must align with 
it,  not  vice  versa.  The  instrument  for  this  purpose  is  the  Poverty  Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) to which the aid must conform (and not be instead based 
on bilaterally negotiated policy conditions). Secondly, aid should be allocated on 
the  basis  of  performance  as  measured  by  monitorable  results  (intermediate 
indicators). 
The general conceptual framework for the two features is that of the principal-
agent model. Donors (countries or international institutions) are already moving in 
the direction of contracts based on monitorable evidence. However, a problem of 
time consistency makes it difficult to identify the moment when to evaluate the 
results: if these are measured in the short term, there is a risk that aspects required 
by a longer time horizon will not be considered; on the other hand, if too much 
time elapses, the efforts by actors to achieve the outcomes become less incisive.  
  Another awkward problem is that the decision to grant aid on the basis of 
performance  may  exclude  from  consideration  countries  which  are  in  greatest 
difficulties, those fragile states incapable of ‘honouring the contract’. 
 
4.2. Methodological problems in the analysis of human capital 
 
Clarifying  the  connection  between  education  and  growth  requires  solving 
diverse  and complicated problems. The first of  them concerns the quality  and 
comparability of the data in cross-country regressions. The data used for many 
backward  countries  are  particularly  unsatisfactory.  Information  is  lacking  on   25
market and informal sectors (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003) and on the variables 
related  to  human  capital:  literacy  rates,  school  enrolment  rates,  levels  of 
educational  attainment,  stock  of  human  capital  per  worker.  Wössman  (2003) 
showed that the correlation among the various measures used for the flow or stock 
of  human  capital  has  high  variability.  In  particular,  rates  of  school  enrolment 
(flow variable) have a variability in time that makes them unreliable as proxies for 
variations in the stock of human capital: there is no correspondence between the 
enrolment rate and the human capital embodied in the labour force, both because 
there  are  educated  individuals  who  are  not  part  of  the  active  population,  and 
because  retirements  are  not  considered.  Temple  (1999)  writes:  “it  is  not  clear 
whether school enrolment rates are intended to represent a flow of investment in 
human capital, or its stock. In practice these rates may be a poor proxy for either” 
(p. 139).  
Moreover, the accumulation of human capital cannot be associated with formal 
education  alone,  because  it  also  comprises  the  transmission  of  skills  and 
knowledge  from parents to children, experience, learning by doing, on-the-job 
training, as well as aspects more directly connected with the type and quality of 
education.  Consideration  of  these  factors  greatly  increases  the  differences  in 
stocks  of  human  capital  among  countries.  Ignoring  such  factors  means 
homogenizing effects that may be very different because, as the microeconomic 
evidence  shows,  the  returns  to  education  vary  considerably  from  country  to 
country, and often also among the regions of the same country. The inclusion of 
country effects or region effects is often significant in estimates, but it combines 
very different effects together (Hanushek and Wössmann, 2007).  
Another  phenomenon  which  is  not  clearly  explained  is  the  causality 
relationship between growth and education (Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003). The 
question is whether technological development is made possible by an exogenous 
increase in the education level of the labour force (impact of investment in human 
capital on growth) or whether structural change induces a larger proportion of the 
population to reach higher standards of education (impact of economic growth on 
investment  in  human  capital).  Various  studies  have  shown  that  growth  entails 
better education. Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) have underlined that the regions 
of India which profited from the Green Revolution of the 1970s saw an increase in 
both  the  returns  to  education  and  in  school  enrolment  rates.  Bils  and  Klenow 
(2000)  argue  that  growth  (driven  by  technology)  generates  a  higher  level  of 
education because it increases the returns on investment in it. Finally, forecasts of 
strong future growth may provoke increases in education. Probably both relations 




The foregoing review of the literature on the effectiveness of aid for the two 
most widely applied growth policies (investment in physical and human capital)   26
has highlighted that research has not yielded clear and robust results. The debate 
and  the  lessons  learned  from  historical  experience  have  shifted  the  dominant 
concern from intervention projects and policy instruments ‘equal for all’ to the 
need to design growth strategies specific to each country (country specificity) and 
to subject the management of those policies to the countries themselves (country 
ownership). A 2005 document of the World Bank states that “the central message 
(...) is that there is no unique universal set of rules (...) we need to get away from 
formulae and the search for elusive ‘best practices’ and rely on deeper economic 
analysis to identify the  binding constraints on  growth” (World Bank, 2005, p. 
xiii).  Similar  priorities  have  been  set  by  the  2005  Paris  Declaration  on  aid 
effectiveness, recently reprised at the Accra meeting (September 2008). 
It is widely agreed that a country-specific approach managed by local actors is 
necessary, but opinions differ on how to translate this new approach into practice. 
Firstly, addressing the problem at the individual country level does not reduce the 
complexity of the factors at the basis of growth. In all cases, it is necessary to take 
account  of  the  complementarity  between  different  sectors  and  dimensions  (for 
instance between productive and infrastructural investments, between investments 
in human capital and trade openness policies, etc.). According to some authors, 
this problem can only be tackled through global and comprehensive plans which 
simultaneously  ‘control’  the  different  dimensions  of  growth  and  development. 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) are devices of this kind, which not 
only  regulate  interdependencies  but  also  consider  specificities.  Experience  has 
shown  that  drawing  up  an  integrated  plan  is  not  enough  if  there  is  no  real 
partnership among the institutions involved, and if people and the community do 
not  feel  themselves  involved  in  the  definition  and  implementation  of  the 
interventions. In fact, large-scale plans involving numerous agents are susceptible 
to the risk of moral hazard, because it is difficult to attribute results and merits to 
specific agents. Moreover, because an enormous number of factors must be taken 
into account, failure can always be blamed on some oversight. When a list of 
interventions  does  not  work,  it  is  extended,  and  as  a  consequence  it  is  never 
possible  to  question  the  approach  in  itself.  The  most  critical  aspect,  however, 
concerns the motivations of the actors involved. If intervention is not made at this 
level, any plan will be ineffective even if all the actions envisaged have been 
accomplished. Stern (2003) has cited a classic example: the construction of new 
schools is not a sufficient condition to increase the school attendance of girls in 
Pakistan; if they are to go to school, the preferences of their parents must change. 
Other  authors  advocate  almost  the  reverse  approach,  which  guarantees  the 
fundamental conditions for the operation of markets related to everyday activities 
(especially secure property rights and international openness) and allows the base 
actors (individuals and enterprises) to operate. It will be their action that ‘designs’ 
the  growth  path  and  therefore  suggests  the  further  changes  necessary  in  the 
institutions and in policies. There are different variants of this second approach in 
the practice of international cooperation: from that of liberal stamp centred on the 
rational  action  of  the    individual  to  the  participative  variant  which  views  the   27
community  as  the  appropriate  actor.  While  this  approach  is  certainly  less 
presumptuous than the first one, it is nevertheless likely to be equally ineffective 
if it ignores the cultural and social factors that induce individuals to pursue certain 
objectives (for instance the unwillingness to have systematic tasks or to respect 
work  schedules;  the  fact  that  women  leave  work  when  they  marry,  etc.)  and 
therefore react in a certain way to the incentives and opportunities offered. To 
used Amartya Sen’s (1981; 1984) terminology, the same set of capabilities may 
lead to different outcomes according to people’s value-judgements. It is evident, 
in fact, that the people’s goals are strongly influenced by the type of experience 
and context in which they have lived. As Ray (2006) observes, “individual desires 
and standards of behavior are often defined by experience and observation; they 
don’t exist in social isolation as consumer preferences are so often assumed to 
do”.  Appadurai  (2004)  stresses  that  a  fundamental  determinant  of  human 
behaviour is the “capacity to aspire” and the poor may not have “the [aspirational] 
resources to contest and alter the conditions of their own poverty”.  
Besides  people’s  motivations,  another  element  decisive  in  determining  the 
final  outcomes  of  a  certain  project,  or  of  new  opportunities,  is  trust.  The 
importance of trust was first pointed out in the early 1970s by Arrow (1972): 
“virtually  every  commercial  transaction  has  within  itself  an  element  of  trust, 
certainly  any  transaction  conducted  over  a  period  of  time.  It  can  be  plausibly 
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by 
the lack of mutual confidence”; and it recurs in the description of the reasons for 
the backwardness of a small village in India given by Woolcock at the end of the 
1990s: “When asked to explain why such miserable conditions prevail in their 
village and what they think needs to be done to improve things, the villagers’ 
answers are revealing. The main problems, they say, are that most people simply 
cannot  be  trusted,  that  local  landlords  exploit  every  opportunity  to  impose 
crushing  rates  of  interest  on  loans,  and  pay  wages  so  low  that  any  personal 
advancement is rendered virtually impossible. There are schools and health clinics 
in the village, they lament, but teachers and doctors regularly fail to show up for 
work. Funds allocated to well-intentioned government programs are siphoned off 
by local elites. Police torture innocent villagers suspected of smuggling. Husbands 
regularly beat or abandon their wives. You venture that surely everyone would all 
be better off if they worked together to begin  addressing some of these basic 
concerns. “Perhaps” they respond, “but any such efforts seem always to come to 
naught.  Development  workers  are  no  different:  just  last  month,  someone  who 
claimed to be from a reputable organization helped us start savings and credit 
groups, only to vanish, absconding with all our hard-earned money. Why should 
we trust you? Why should we trust anyone?” (Woolcock, 1998). 
People’s  aspirations  and  judgements  on  the  likelihood  of  achieving  those 
aspirations,  as  well  as  their  trust  in  those  who  offer  new  opportunities,  are 
decisive factors so that people do not remain passive claimants but take initiatives 
to improve their lives. Engendering development requires more than opportunities 
(offered by public policies, cooperation projects, or the initiatives of civil society   28
organizations):  these  must  be  taken  up  by  the  subjects  for  whom  they  are 
intended.  From  this  point  of  view,  also  the  liberal  position  is  partial  and 
ineffective if it starts from the assumption that people are already in an ‘active’ 
position with respect to their circumstances. The liberal recipe, like that of large-
scale  policies  based  on  all-inclusive  plans,  must  accept  the  challenge  of 
comparing itself with the way in which people approach reality and the need of 
change that may emerge. 
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￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿%  #￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿( &￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ , )￿￿$￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿* ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿(￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, 
)￿￿$￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  )￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿. ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ /￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿&￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿’￿￿￿2￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ (￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿ 5￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ )￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿+ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿%￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿. ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿(￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿3￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-￿￿￿￿￿4￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿￿5￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿*￿-￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿0(￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
6￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&2￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿0￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&2￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿
#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿1 1 ￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ /￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ (￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿1 1 ￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿5￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿ ￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿&2￿￿￿￿￿￿2￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ !￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ 7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ’￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿% ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2￿￿5￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ %￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8  0￿6(￿￿￿
9￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ .￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿,￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ .￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿1 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ .￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ /￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ .￿!￿4 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿7 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿
-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ .￿%￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ .￿(￿ ’￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ -￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ -￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ; ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿7 8 ￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿1 1 ￿￿￿2￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿9￿￿￿:￿ ￿￿2￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿;￿￿￿￿￿￿




￿ ￿ ￿ .￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ (. ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿. ￿
￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿5. ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ .￿.￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿







































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿